Overshoot, Ambition, Equity

With more than three decades of inadequate climate efforts behind us, it’s perhaps time to take stock. This is particularly true because there is no longer any achievable future in which we stop the warming before it reaches and then exceeds 1.5°C, sending us stumbling into the unpromising world that lies beyond it. Thus the Paris Agreement’s challenge – “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”– can only mean passing through a period of “overshoot”, during which Earth’s warming exceeds 1.5°C, and then fighting our way back to it, as best we can.

Welcome, then, to a planetary challenge that will, perhaps more than any other, define our common future. The question now is whether, as a civilization, we’ll be able to hold the overshoot low enough, and keep it short enough, to draw the temperature increase back to 1.5°C within a humanly meaningful timeframe. This won’t be easy, and there are plenty of scientists among us who think it will be impossible, at least without geoengineering. Be that as it may, the truth of our predicament is now clear enough: absent an extremely ambitious global mobilization – one that would require a profound transformation of the political, economic, and institutional regime – there really is no chance at all.

I do not make this statement lightly.

How could I when the years since Paris have stymied all dreams of a robust new age of multilateral cooperation? When, indeed, the world system appears to be muddling into a deranged state that promises anything but ambitious mobilization? When honesty compels us to admit that we really may fail to stabilize the climate system before all hell breaks loose?

A stylized picture of planetary tipping elements (see here)

To be clear, a low overshoot future in which we avoid irrevocable tipping points is still physically possible. Physically. But, nonetheless, we’re beyond anything like optimism. The future in which we stabilize the climate system and then rebuild our civilizational infrastructure is one that presupposes luck as well as will, and a good deal of strategic courage. Whatever happens, we’re going to have to think hard about a new realism that focuses on delivering the political and economic preconditions of robust national and international cooperation. Because without cooperation we’re toast.

Just a decade or so ago, it was common to hear this challenge framed in military terns. Bill McKibben crisply made the case in a 2016 piece that told us that climate mobilization is not “like a world war. It is a world war.” More recently, this framing has found fewer fans, though personally I still see its point. Just as I see why we still hear talk of “revolution,” though like “the moral equivalent of war” (William James) it too does not seem to be in the short-term cards, save perhaps for the special case of “technological revolution,” as for example the solar / electric revolution.

This substack, for its part, will argue that that tech revolution is not enough. More precisely, it will argue that our only realistic hope is one in which a thoroughgoing technological transition unfolds alongside a high cooperation world order. A transition in which very rapid and politically sustainable emission reductions, and the economic justice needed to sustain them, have become focusing goals.

Here, unfortunately, I must add that I’m not smoking something. The obvious truth is that robust international cooperation looks a lot less likely than a future in which countries and blocs of countries find themselves rivals in a catastrophic “warlord world”. It’s also necessary to clearly note that, if indeed this interregnum ends in a world order characterized by warring spheres of influence and weaponized economic relations, we’re unlikely to see the emergence of any effective system of planetary governance. In such a future, the stabilization of the climate system will not be high on the agenda.

This is true even given the green energy revolution now on our doorstep, for the simple reason that the transformation we need is more than merely technological. To be sure, we have to rebuild almost everything, and this is very much a technology challenge. But it’s also necessary to prioritize human needs – and the needs of first nature – over excessive consumption. And to ensure that the wealthy countries of the Global North phase out fossil fuel production and consumption first and fastest. And to find our way to a world order in which the rich pay their fair shares of the cost of a global transition that is designed to support workers and communities as they seek to adapt to a profoundly different economy, which will itself have to adapt to a profoundly different planetary system.

In this context, equity is everything, and we have to get a lot clearer about its demands. This means thinking hard about international as well as local climate justice. It means “fair shares” approaches like the one EcoEquity and its allies have long championed, and a commitment to continue developing a politics of justice that is sufficient to the challenges now before us. It means taking proper account of the exhaustion of the global carbon budget, and the overhangs of colonialism, and the challenges of unequal exchange, and the limits of liberal multilateralism, and of course the stark realities of planetary boundaries, all of which tell us that distributional justice is and will remain fundamental to the politics of the coming transition.

It’s a lot, and it remains a lot even if we stipulate that perfect justice is not our proper goal. What we most need now is a transition strategy, one that’s fair enough to actually succeed. The good news is that a transition to a fairer world is absolutely on the agenda, for all sorts of reasons. Climate is hardly the only emergency we’re facing these days.

***

Before I close, let me try to make this a bit more concrete. . .

The climate reckoning demands that all countries take urgent and immediate action. Which is a real problem, because without a great deal of financial and technological support from the rich world, it will be impossible for the poorer countries to act at the necessary speed and scale.

How could this work? We don’t know, not in detail, but there are a lot of great ideas being knocked around! One clear bottom line is that the wealthy among us – not all of them in the Global North – will have to finance the transition. Another is that a significant redistribution of wealth – think energy subsidy reform, and progressive global taxation, and a shift from a winner-take-all world to a just-transition economy – must become integral to the climate action agenda.

Also, the climate transition is going to convert achievable wins into momentum. Climate action – whether it be climate justice in Louisiana, solar buildout in Pakistan, or a bit of bravery on the part of a UNFCCC negotiating team – has to lead to even more action, and ever more ambition in the face of ever greater clarity about the larger challenges.

Consider the fossil fuel phase out, or rather the “transition away from fossil fuels,” as it was called in the COP28 decision text. The key here is that all countries can’t be expected to phase out at the same time and speed – some must phase out first and quickly, so that others have more can time, so that all of them, together, can achieve the nearly impossible level of ambition that is now needed if we’re to stabilize the climate system. Which in turn means that some countries, and the rich within all countries, must provide financial and technological support to other countries, and to the aspiring poor, so that they can decarbonize faster and farther than they could ever hope to manage on their own.

How could all this be possible? Again, the details are to be determined. What we know is that ours is a twice divided world, with the Global North countries in one camp and the Global South countries in another, with both camps bitterly riven between the rich and the rest. That dozens of countries are now besieged by nationalist authoritarians who build power by campaigning against threatening outsiders. That the idea of international solidarity – if it is even mooted – can seem, when contrasted against the darkening political reality, to be little more than a utopian dream. That, despite all this, the central question of international climate justice remains the question of international finance.

It should be obvious, at this late date, that any sort of successful climate transition, let alone a fair one, may be beyond our reach. But it’s also true that the only kind of climate transition that has a real chance at success is one that gathers together all the yearnings and strategies of the now burgeoning global justice movement. And that far too many people, particularly in the Global North, have been avoiding this truth for years. Fortunately, the world is changing, and the reticence is fading. Which is very good news, because we’re running out of time.

There are lots of hard questions. How should we frame the obligations of the wealthy countries, the US first among them? What about the obligations of rich people, not all of who are in the Global North? How should we understand the “science versus equity” skirmishes that now threaten to cripple the IPCC? How, in a world of limits, do we balance need against desire? What are we to do about the grim fact that the world’s ruling elites seem incapable of facing the core reality of the reckoning – we, as a civilization, will face the distributional justice challenges of stabilizing the climate system, or we will fail.

A Fossil Fuel Phaseout?

This past spring, 57 countries met in Santa Marta, Colombia to begin planning a global phaseout of fossil fuels.  What are their chances?  

First published in Foreign Policy in Focus

It’s no secret that the climate negotiations are failing. The simple fact is that the carbon concentration of the atmosphere continues to rise, rapidly and along a pathway that threatens—but does not yet guarantee—true catastrophe. 

That said, there’s little agreement on why the climate negotiations are failing, or what their role would be in the emergency global transition that’s so desperately needed. Such a transition will have to be very widely accepted as fair if it is to have a chance of success, and the negotiations as we have them are hardly rising to the challenges of global climate justice. Is this likely to change soon? Perhaps not, but such a change is both necessary and possible, and the goal has to be to increase the odds. 

One promising way of doing so is to concentrate global effort on launching a global push to phase out fossil fuels—that is, a phase out of both fossil fuel extraction and consumption, and the simultaneous development and global deployment of a fossil-fuel free energy economy. Such a phaseout would not solve the whole of the climate problem, let alone the still larger ecological crisis, but it would make solutions possible. The phaseout challenge is one that, as Eisenhower used to say, is “big enough to solve”.

The Road to Santa Marta

The story of the climate negotiations can be told many ways. I like to tell it as a story of failure, and renewed effort, and late, inadequate, steps forward. Such a process gave us the foundational U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Paris Agreement, and the hard-won breakthrough at 2023’s COP28 in Dubai, where the world’s nations agreed to “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner”. The question is if the current impasse, which settled in after Dubai, will play out in similar fashion. 

But first, know that a great burst of joy accompanied the Dubai agreement’s inclusion of the words “transitioning away from fossil fuels.” It broke a firewall that had held for decades, one in which a blocking coalition led by the Saudis and the American oil companies, playing a long and Machiavellian game, was able to keep fossil fuels from even being mentioned in a formal COP decision.  

Continue reading “A Fossil Fuel Phaseout?”

Ten Years After Paris

Not failure, not yet, but we can see it from here

2015’s Paris Agreement could have been a turning point. It posited a world in which all countries – the wealthy and the rest – would do their proper parts, as they saw them, to stabilize the climate system. Paris wasn’t ideal — there was no agreed way of understanding national fair shares in the common effort of global transition, and no real climate finance strategy, and of course there was no enforcement. But there was still a real chance at another pathway, another storyline.

Ten years later, such guarded hope is even more difficult to sustain. Despite a superbloom of technological solutions, the international climate regime is failing catastrophically. Paris promised a new kind of cooperation, but instead the talks have been stalled by systemic pathologies rooted in long historical injustices, by grotesque levels of inequality both between and within countries, and by the entrenched power of the fossil-fuel complex. Current policies are steering the world far beyond the 1.5°C warming limit, with devastating consequences already being borne disproportionately by the poor, especially in the Global South.

The abject inadequacy of the NDCs (the national pledges) is a consequence and not a cause. The central fact of the Paris regime is that the NDCs are weak because there has been no meaningful finance breakthrough. Nor can there be, not while the wealthy – people and nations – utterly fail to do their fair shares. This is one of the key points of  this year’s Equity Review, Inequity, Inequality, Inaction, a report that stresses that Global North countries have uniformly failed to do their fair shares; and that while Global South countries — with important exceptions — have done far better, they too have not done enough; and that, absent the finance support they need to leapfrog to a post-carbon world, they cannot reasonably be expected to.

As one of the authors of Inequity, Inequality, Inaction,  I fear it will be overlooked in the informational avalanche of the COP. So let me add, as an enticement to your attention, that we have allowed ourselves to stray from the  stiff, overdrawn Global North vs Global South positions that often define international climate politics. The whole truth is more complex, and we have, in this report, tried to face it. We have in particular concluded that, at a certain point, the finger of blame must turn from the Global North and point directly at the world’s rich elites, who have repeatedly used their vast wealth to amass disproportionate political power, and then used that power to service their often fatally short-sighted conceits and self-interests.

This isn’t exactly news, but neither have the dots here been clearly and repeatedly connected. The fact is that the world’s rich could easily afford to finance a just global climate transition, and would barely even notice, say, an expenditure of $1.3 trillion, the amount needed to deliver on the Baku to Belem roadmap. Such a figure fades to insignificance compared to the additional $33.9 trillion the global one percent have accumulated since Paris. The rich could pay the entire cost of the roadmap, say by way of progressive global climate taxes, and hardly feel it.

Not that I expect them to embrace such taxes anytime soon. In fact, this is a moment of retrenchment and “greenlash,” and incrementalism, we are endlessly told, is the order of the day. But let us not bend too quickly to agree. The truth is rather that the climate reckoning demands a more challenging kind of realism, a “climate realism” that takes the imperatives of both science and justice into proper account, and admits (sorry if I sound like a “doomer”) that our civilizational survival is contingent on a transition to a fairer world.

It’s too late to avoid a 1.5°C overshoot, but it’s not yet too late to keep that overshoot reasonably brief and shallow, and to do absolutely everything in our power to avoid even a transient warming of 2°C, which we can now now begin to see, dimly but unmistakably, on the near horizon. Unfortunately, given the power of the fossil-fuel complex – from Houston to Riyadh to Moscow – this is shaping up to be a tall order indeed. It’s not too much to say that everything depends, as per Dubai’s final agreement, on “transitioning away from fossil fuels.” We can only hope that the Brazilians play their hand well in Belém, and that COP30 somehow manages, in the words of environment minister Marina Silva, to land an outcome that “sends a message” on a “just, planned, gradual and long-term decommissioning of fossil fuels”.

Silva is being “realistic” of course. You can tell by her reference to “gradual and long-term” decommissioning. In truth, the fossil-fuel phaseout had best happen as quickly as humanly possible, and even in the best case, wherein we achieve the “highest possible ambition” called for by the Court of International Justice, we’re going to be flirting with catastrophe.

See INEQUITY, INEQUALITY, INACTION — A civil society equity review of the post-Paris climate regime and the new NDCs, with a focus on mitigation, the role of climate finance, and equity and fair shares across and within countries.

Not America Apart

The arts of international coalition-building are daunting . . .

Originally published in Earth Island Journal, here

Let’s be honest.

Many activists have long insisted that the international climate negotiations are bullshit, greenwashing, Kabuki. Or, more charitably, that they are simply doomed. For those in this camp, the negotiations have primarily been occasions for protest and networking, most of it “outside” the conference zones. As for the negotiations themselves, and even their greatest accomplishment — 2015’s Paris Agreement — these are seen as mere feints, overblown failures.

But if the negotiations are failures, so too is everything else. The renewables revolution has not forced the rapid retirement of existing fossil fuel infrastructure. Mainstream techno-legislative strategies have provoked changes only at the margins. The protests, even the largest of them, have not driven the emergence of a viable transition strategy. Even the frontline battles, essential though they are, have done little to stop, say, the rate of sea level rise.

The climate movement’s “inside” wing — that works within the formal negotiating system — tries its best, at every turn, to grind real wins out of a long-deadlocked and fantastically frustrating process. It is strange and often lonely work, but if you believe global governance will be needed to stabilize the climate system, then you believe the negotiations must be continued, even though, to date, they have “failed.” And you believe they are essential, even though the prospects for not only climate diplomacy, but diplomacy in general, have come to seem increasingly futile. So the question today isn’t whether the climate negotiations are doomed. Rather, it is whether the fractious nations of the twenty-first-century world, besieged by fossil capitalism and tides of cheap nationalism, will be able to cooperatively face their deteriorating conditions of existence.

The real problem has never been inside the negotiation halls. It’s that the nations that determine what happens in those halls are still locked into a catastrophically unjust system in which the political right and the fossil fuel industry can block all effective action. For instance, the United States (admittedly an extreme case) is paralyzed by its far right, to the point where we can barely imagine it doing its fair part in any global mobilization.

The story of the future is a global story. The old saw — “Think Globally, Act Locally” — isn’t going to cut it. Though, as my experiences in EcoEquity have taught me, acting globally is no simple matter, nor does one do it alone. I learned this quickly enough when I walked into my first climate COP — it was COP6, at The Hague, in 1999 — and I’m still learning it today.

The arts of coalition are daunting, even when the coalitions are local. When global coalitions are at issue, and when you’re working with a sea of actors that includes not just, say, the activists of Power Shift Africa but also, say, the government of Saudi Arabia, the coalitions are daunting indeed. Both activists and governments are trapped within them and lost without them.

Continue reading “Not America Apart”

Guest Essay: A New Idea as COP30 Approaches

Robin Hahnel, U.S. left libertarian economist and stalwart of participatory economics, has long been a friend of EcoEquity, and of the Climate Equity Framework that defines much of its work. In this guest essay, he argues that a fair shares climate transition can most effectively be financed by a global emissions trading system. Such an idea will of course be anathema to many of today’s activists, but note well that Hahnel speaks for a system in which “trades” only count towards a nation’s fair share if they are aggregated and accounted at the national level — like so:

“(1) If they wish any country government should be allowed to certify emission reduction credits for emitters within its national territory who apply for credits to sell.

(2) When calculating whether a country has complied with its national pledge to reduce emissions, any emission reduction credits purchased by anyone within the country will be added to the country’s national emission allowance, and any emission reduction credits sold by anyone within the country will be subtracted from the country’s national emission allowance.”

By Robin Hahnel.  Robin can be reached at robinhahnel1946@gmail.com

 

Ideally an international climate agreement would be:

  1. Effective: Reduce global emissions sufficiently to reduce the danger of cataclysmic climate change to an acceptable risk before it becomes too late.
  2. Equitable: Countries’ responsibilities for emission reductions should depend on (a) how much they contributed to creating the problem and (b) how capable they are of contributing to its solution.
  3. Efficient: The overall cost of reducing global emissions should be minimized.

Readers should always ask whether, and to what extent, any proposal under discussion achieves these three goals – what we might call the three “E’s” for an international climate agreement.

In Climate Change Not All Countries are Created Equal!

Before presenting a proposal for an agreement that would be effective, equitable, and efficient I want to explain where the distinction between “economically more developed countries” and “economically less developed countries” came from, and the important role it has played in international climate negotiations. The terminology “more developed countries,” or MDCs, and “less developed countries,” or LDCs, is taken from the development economics literature. More economically developed countries traditionally include countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and the countries which comprise the European Union. Most other countries, whose citizens have yet to enjoy the benefits of economic development, are traditionally designated as less developed countries.

Under the Kyoto protocol, which was negotiated in Kyoto Japan in 1997 and entered into force in 2005 after it was ratified by 192 countries, but not the United States, only countries designated as more developed were expected to commit to mandatory emission reductions, while less developed countries were excluded from mandatory emission reductions, presumably until they reach some higher level of economic development. However, this binary distinction between more and less developed countries fails to take account of important differences within each category. For example, China and the Republic of the Congo were both classified as less developed countries under the Kyoto protocol. But China bears much more responsibility for causing climate change and has much more capability to contribute toward its solution than the Republic of Congo; even though China bears far less responsibility and capability than the United States, which of course is classified as a more developed country.

While international negotiations continue to be dominated by disputes between less developed and more developed “blocs,” in truth the binary distinction between more developed and less developed countries is quite imprecise. For years nobody had developed procedures to overcome this problem. However, fortunately, that is no longer the case. We can now measure different levels of responsibility and capability on a continuum. Continue reading “Guest Essay: A New Idea as COP30 Approaches”

After COP29: The Climate Negotiations Reach Their Crisis

This essay was first published in Foreign Policy in Focus

I have for decades been assuring both colleagues and comrades that the climate negotiations are not a sick joke, that “COP” is not short for “Conference of Polluters,” that the negotiations matter. The argument has become easier to make as more people have come to see the implacable necessity of an international way forward. As imperfect as the COP process is, a world without multilateral climate negotiations would be far worse.

Still, there comes a time, amidst the floods and the firestorms, when even the practiced realism of seasoned observers must break down. This time didn’t quite come at COP29, though it came close. As Martin Wolf put it in the Financial Times, “the assessment has to lie between failure and disaster—failure, because progress is still possible, or disaster, because a good agreement will now be too late.”

The climate problem demands an earnest and cooperative international response, but Baku instead saw the Global North present the Global South with a “grim ultimatum”—agree to an inadequate offer of support or risk the collapse of the only international process where it has significant voice and influence. By its end, the Global South had been forced to accede. With the clap of the president’s gavel, and despite a broad push to assert that “no deal is better than a bad deal,” it got a very bad deal indeed.

There was also action on the emissions trading front, where the rules were finally nailed down. But the rules are pretty bad and the deal is more likely to generate a flood of illusory offsets than a flood of quality investment. Also, and importantly, neither carbon trading in particular nor private finance in general can honestly be expected to entirely finance a successful climate transition.

On the public finance side, the pressure to relitigate the Baku deal, already high, can only increase. The last-minute adoption of the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3 trillion”—a critical commitment to find a real path forward—is likely to define the COP30 agenda. The problem is that, barring an unanticipated political shift of the first order, the Belém COP, too, will fail to rise to the occasion.

Continue reading “After COP29: The Climate Negotiations Reach Their Crisis”

Fair Shares, Finance, Transformation

A number of things are now obvious. The shape of the future is not among them.

We know, for example, that Donald J. Trump is likely to pull the US out of the Paris Agreement (and maybe even the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), and this despite the terrifying, and rising, instability of the climate system. To pick one horror from among thousands – we now know that the AMOC, the Atlantic Overturning Meridional Circulation, is far more likely to collapse than was hitherto projected, and soon, and with “devastating and irreversible” consequences. 

There is much to say, about Trump, about the political crisis, and about the climate reckoning. I will hazard just one claim – the “neoliberal order,” as historian Gary Gerstle calls it, is clearly behind us, and though we are still trudging through Gramsci’s interregnum, there are signs that it, too, is ending. The order, or disorder, that replaces it will have everything to do with the planetary boundaries we’re now crossing, and with the political and equity challenges they present. Its precise nature will be defined by how, and how successfully, we face these challenges. 

Since I’m writing this during COP29, the “finance COP,” I’ll say a few words about money. I particularly want to note 2024’s Civil Society Equity Review, which I helped to write (there were about six principle authors) and which we’ve called Fair Shares, Finance, Transformation: Fair Shares Assessment, Equitable Fossil Fuel Phaseout, and Public Finance for Just Global Climate Stabilization. I’ve been working on the annual Equity Review since 2015 – the Paris year – but I’m particularly pleased with this new report. You’re no doubt too busy to read it, but you should try to take a look. It’s probably worth your time.

Our key message is that stabilizing the climate quickly enough to prevent catastrophe is going to be expensive, but that we nonetheless have the money. Or, rather, the global rich have the money, and – one way or another – they are going to have to pay, as per Foreign Policy’s rather inelegant formulation, to “help fix the planet”.  

The 2024 Civil Society Equity Reviews includes:

  • An updated look at fairness, and unfairness, of the current NDCs , out to 2035

  • A concise overview of the equity challenges posed by the unavoidable need for a rapid global fossil-fuel extraction phaseout
  • A quick survey of the key barriers to climate mobilization — the protracted inaction of the global North, the organized obstruction of the fossil-fuel industry, and the parasitism of the global rich.
  • An overview of the most obvious possible sources public climate finance on the necessary scale — hundreds of billions and trillions of dollars.
  • The discussion of the need to begin with large scale, short-term finance reforms, while preparing the ground for the system change that will be needed to fully transition away from the inequitable, fossil fuel dependent society we have today.

The finance challenge

How much would it cost to save ourselves and our civilization? You’ll find plenty of details – and footnotes – in the report. What I will say here, and what climate policy activists around the world are stressing, is that the figure is denominated in trillions, not billions, of dollars a year, and that a good deal of this must come as public finance. This latter necessity – the need for the new global finance goal, the “New Collective Quantified Goal”, to have a large grant and grant-equivalent public finance core – is now, finally, at the center of the UN climate negotiations. 

Trillions of dollars in public finance, obviously, are not yet on offer. Indeed, with authoritarian populism on the main stage – and not just in the US – the battle for public finance for the public good is mired in the myths and agenda of the right. Instead of fighting a long-term battle for a new international finance architecture, one fit for the purposes now before us, we are forced to engage in endless short-term battles to prevent further tax cuts for the rich, further attacks of our social safety nets, further deregulation, further militarism, further dismissals of any fundamental sense of global solidarity. All that said, this last year has nonetheless seen an explosion of work designed to show that we have the money. 

Here for example, is a table from Fair Shares, Finance, Transformation:

The Civil Society Equity Review is not alone in making this case. See for example here, and here, and here, and here, and here. But the 2024 Civil Society Equity Review report is notable for the deliberate manner in which it lays out the path forward, for the way it names and quantifies the barriers to decarbonization and for its careful, explicit distinction between finance sources that are immediately available, given only political and economic reforms, and more fundamental transformations that will require deeper system change.

***

We’re moving now into a new phase in the climate battle, and because it has so much to do with finance, it is important to stress that there is more on the table than just money. Think of the global South’s overwhelming international debt, which can never be repaid. Think of our massively unbalanced and unsustainable international trading system. Think of the planetary divide between the rich and the poor, and how the global rich exploit it at every turn.

Still, we have the money, or could, and this is extremely good news – to stabilize the climate system in time, we’re going to need a “global just transition”, and it’s not going to be cheap. This is the main point here, but we also have to realize that there’s a danger in focusing too tightly on finance. Doing so can create the impression that finance is the key to a future that can, in effect, be seen as a lower-carbon version of business as usual. But this is not the case. Sure, climate transition must begin here in the “real world,” but there’s no such thing as climate-friendly business as usual. If we pretend there is, we will only find that other elements of business as usual will undermine effective climate action.

Fortunately, the situation is fluid, and filled with possibility. People everywhere are concluding that we’re at a tipping point, and perhaps we are. The climate negotiations, certainly, are heading for crisis. Perhaps the finance showdown will lead to clarity, and break the deadlocks that have mired the negotiations now for decades. That said, superficial reforms will not be enough, precisely because equity is a prerequisite of rapid decarbonization. Nor will equity as a mere principle suffice. We also need equity as a nexus of political realism, for it is quite impossible to imagine collecting, or releasing, the trillions of dollars that the global finance transformation will demand unless this is done in a manner that is very widely – and internationally – seen as fair.

Rapid planetary decarbonization will only be possible if the global North pays its fair share of the cost. This is only possible if the rich, everywhere, do the same. Nor is this an exorbitant demand – a trillion dollars a year in public climate finance would be enough to get things moving. It is not much, but it is an implacable necessity. That’s the point. 

***

Also, note that the Fair Shares, Finance, Transformation report has received some nice publicity in the US.

Wen Stephenson, who recognized its importance, invited me to do a Q&A session about it and its core arguments for The Nation.  It was a lively exchange, and you can read Wen’s synopsis of it here.

And Bill McKibben has quoted it, and me on it, in his substack newsletter, The Crucial Years. Bill has a good eye for a punchy quote,, and notes that the report decries the “organized obstructionism of the fossil fuel industry and the parasitism of the global rich.”

After Dubai — Towards a “just, orderly, and equitable” fossil fuel phase out

This essay was originally published in Foreign Policy in Focus

Just before the recent climate summit in Dubai, COP28 president Sultan Al-Jaber, with some exasperation, came out with the following rather amazing statement:

“Please help me, show me the roadmap for a phase out of fossil fuel that will allow for sustainable socioeconomic development, unless you want to take the world back into caves.”

Al-Jabar was posturing when he made this quip about caves, but he can almost be forgiven. We badly need a roadmap for a “phase out of fossil fuel that will allow for sustainable socioeconomic development.” By noting the lack of one, he underscored its absence. This is true even if he spoke as a flack of the fossil fuel cartel.

Speaking of COP28, it helped settle the question of the COPs, which still troubles the climate left. The COPs are easily dismissed as “blah blah blah.” But they are, in a word, necessary. We would be in far greater trouble without them, and this is true even though the COPs are condemned to make decisions by consensus, even though they engender endless greenwashing, even though, with next year’s COP29 slated for Azerbaijan, two in a row will be hosted by straight-up petrostates.

The climate negotiations are finally circling core issues. COP26 saw a decision to “phase down” coal, and COP28 opened with the Loss and Damage fund finally lurching into existence. Then came COP28’s key decision text, which called for “Transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science.” Only a month later—with President Biden’s move to “pause” the approval of new liquified natural gas terminals, a decision the White House explicitly linked to COP28— the COP decision demonstrated real world benefits. It could have many more in the future, including outside the United States.

Meanwhile, COP29 is set to see the next big battle begin in earnest, as climate finance takes center stage. This battle could (if all goes well) culminate in 2025, where COP30 will be hosted by Lula da Sila’s Brazil, and deliver a meaningful decision on that crucial front. This is not the time to performatively insist that COP stands for “conference of polluters.”

Having said all this, I must immediately add that the climate negotiations have thus far failed, as decisively witnessed by the steadily rising atmospheric carbon-dioxide concentration. COP skeptics are quite right about this. But in their failure the international negotiations are hardly alone. Domestic climate action has had many victories, but it has hardly put us on a path to deep and rapid decarbonization. Nor has the green technology revolution brought planetary emissions into a peak-and-decline pathway. Nor—and this is not easy to say—have the world’s direct action and climate justice movements filled the gaps. Politically, they may be everything, but they too have failed to stop the warming.

One key point: the COP28 text does not simply call for transitioning away from fossil fuels but rather stipulates that this transition must be “just, orderly, and equitable,” a much more challenging prospect. This led Sivan Kartha, a climate equity specialist at the Stockholm Environment Institute, to add that the “deepest fissure” in Dubai was between those who simply want a rapid fossil phase out and those who insist that, to have any hope of success, such a phase out must be fair.

Many of us agree—but what does such fairness imply? 

Continue reading “After Dubai — Towards a “just, orderly, and equitable” fossil fuel phase out”