With more than three decades of inadequate climate efforts behind us, it’s perhaps time to take stock. This is particularly true because there is no longer any achievable future in which we stop the warming before it reaches and then exceeds 1.5°C, sending us stumbling into the unpromising world that lies beyond it. Thus the Paris Agreement’s challenge – “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”– can only mean passing through a period of “overshoot”, during which Earth’s warming exceeds 1.5°C, and then fighting our way back to it, as best we can.
Welcome, then, to a planetary challenge that will, perhaps more than any other, define our common future. The question now is whether, as a civilization, we’ll be able to hold the overshoot low enough, and keep it short enough, to draw the temperature increase back to 1.5°C within a humanly meaningful timeframe. This won’t be easy, and there are plenty of scientists among us who think it will be impossible, at least without geoengineering. Be that as it may, the truth of our predicament is now clear enough: absent an extremely ambitious global mobilization – one that would require a profound transformation of the political, economic, and institutional regime – there really is no chance at all.
I do not make this statement lightly.
How could I when the years since Paris have stymied all dreams of a robust new age of multilateral cooperation? When, indeed, the world system appears to be muddling into a deranged state that promises anything but ambitious mobilization? When honesty compels us to admit that we really may fail to stabilize the climate system before all hell breaks loose?

A stylized picture of planetary tipping elements (see here)
To be clear, a low overshoot future in which we avoid irrevocable tipping points is still physically possible. Physically. But, nonetheless, we’re beyond anything like optimism. The future in which we stabilize the climate system and then rebuild our civilizational infrastructure is one that presupposes luck as well as will, and a good deal of strategic courage. Whatever happens, we’re going to have to think hard about a new realism that focuses on delivering the political and economic preconditions of robust national and international cooperation. Because without cooperation we’re toast.
Just a decade or so ago, it was common to hear this challenge framed in military terns. Bill McKibben crisply made the case in a 2016 piece that told us that climate mobilization is not “like a world war. It is a world war.” More recently, this framing has found fewer fans, though personally I still see its point. Just as I see why we still hear talk of “revolution,” though like “the moral equivalent of war” (William James) it too does not seem to be in the short-term cards, save perhaps for the special case of “technological revolution,” as for example the solar / electric revolution.
This substack, for its part, will argue that that tech revolution is not enough. More precisely, it will argue that our only realistic hope is one in which a thoroughgoing technological transition unfolds alongside a high cooperation world order. A transition in which very rapid and politically sustainable emission reductions, and the economic justice needed to sustain them, have become focusing goals.
Here, unfortunately, I must add that I’m not smoking something. The obvious truth is that robust international cooperation looks a lot less likely than a future in which countries and blocs of countries find themselves rivals in a catastrophic “warlord world”. It’s also necessary to clearly note that, if indeed this interregnum ends in a world order characterized by warring spheres of influence and weaponized economic relations, we’re unlikely to see the emergence of any effective system of planetary governance. In such a future, the stabilization of the climate system will not be high on the agenda.
This is true even given the green energy revolution now on our doorstep, for the simple reason that the transformation we need is more than merely technological. To be sure, we have to rebuild almost everything, and this is very much a technology challenge. But it’s also necessary to prioritize human needs – and the needs of first nature – over excessive consumption. And to ensure that the wealthy countries of the Global North phase out fossil fuel production and consumption first and fastest. And to find our way to a world order in which the rich pay their fair shares of the cost of a global transition that is designed to support workers and communities as they seek to adapt to a profoundly different economy, which will itself have to adapt to a profoundly different planetary system.
In this context, equity is everything, and we have to get a lot clearer about its demands. This means thinking hard about international as well as local climate justice. It means “fair shares” approaches like the one EcoEquity and its allies have long championed, and a commitment to continue developing a politics of justice that is sufficient to the challenges now before us. It means taking proper account of the exhaustion of the global carbon budget, and the overhangs of colonialism, and the challenges of unequal exchange, and the limits of liberal multilateralism, and of course the stark realities of planetary boundaries, all of which tell us that distributional justice is and will remain fundamental to the politics of the coming transition.
It’s a lot, and it remains a lot even if we stipulate that perfect justice is not our proper goal. What we most need now is a transition strategy, one that’s fair enough to actually succeed. The good news is that a transition to a fairer world is absolutely on the agenda, for all sorts of reasons. Climate is hardly the only emergency we’re facing these days.
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Before I close, let me try to make this a bit more concrete. . .
The climate reckoning demands that all countries take urgent and immediate action. Which is a real problem, because without a great deal of financial and technological support from the rich world, it will be impossible for the poorer countries to act at the necessary speed and scale.
How could this work? We don’t know, not in detail, but there are a lot of great ideas being knocked around! One clear bottom line is that the wealthy among us – not all of them in the Global North – will have to finance the transition. Another is that a significant redistribution of wealth – think energy subsidy reform, and progressive global taxation, and a shift from a winner-take-all world to a just-transition economy – must become integral to the climate action agenda.
Also, the climate transition is going to convert achievable wins into momentum. Climate action – whether it be climate justice in Louisiana, solar buildout in Pakistan, or a bit of bravery on the part of a UNFCCC negotiating team – has to lead to even more action, and ever more ambition in the face of ever greater clarity about the larger challenges.
Consider the fossil fuel phase out, or rather the “transition away from fossil fuels,” as it was called in the COP28 decision text. The key here is that all countries can’t be expected to phase out at the same time and speed – some must phase out first and quickly, so that others have more can time, so that all of them, together, can achieve the nearly impossible level of ambition that is now needed if we’re to stabilize the climate system. Which in turn means that some countries, and the rich within all countries, must provide financial and technological support to other countries, and to the aspiring poor, so that they can decarbonize faster and farther than they could ever hope to manage on their own.
How could all this be possible? Again, the details are to be determined. What we know is that ours is a twice divided world, with the Global North countries in one camp and the Global South countries in another, with both camps bitterly riven between the rich and the rest. That dozens of countries are now besieged by nationalist authoritarians who build power by campaigning against threatening outsiders. That the idea of international solidarity – if it is even mooted – can seem, when contrasted against the darkening political reality, to be little more than a utopian dream. That, despite all this, the central question of international climate justice remains the question of international finance.
It should be obvious, at this late date, that any sort of successful climate transition, let alone a fair one, may be beyond our reach. But it’s also true that the only kind of climate transition that has a real chance at success is one that gathers together all the yearnings and strategies of the now burgeoning global justice movement. And that far too many people, particularly in the Global North, have been avoiding this truth for years. Fortunately, the world is changing, and the reticence is fading. Which is very good news, because we’re running out of time.
There are lots of hard questions. How should we frame the obligations of the wealthy countries, the US first among them? What about the obligations of rich people, not all of who are in the Global North? How should we understand the “science versus equity” skirmishes that now threaten to cripple the IPCC? How, in a world of limits, do we balance need against desire? What are we to do about the grim fact that the world’s ruling elites seem incapable of facing the core reality of the reckoning – we, as a civilization, will face the distributional justice challenges of stabilizing the climate system, or we will fail.

